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Abstract
We build a model of imperfect competition where …rms can sell
for cash or in-kind payments. Barter is indivisible, and there is no
double coincidence of wants. Despite these de…ciencies, barter emerges
in equilibrium as a means of price discrimination if market power
is su¢ciently concentrated. The model predicts negative correlation
between number of sellers and share of barter in sales. We also show
that barter disappears at certain level of concentration. Using survey
data on Russian …rms, we show that empirical evidence is consistent
with predictions of the model.
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11 Introduction
Rapid growth of non-monetary transactions is one of the most striking fea-
tures of Russia’s transition to a market economy. Russian economy has
become highly demonetized. Since the macroeconomic stabilization of 1995,
the broad money base M2 has been only about 15 per cent of annual GDP
which is far below levels observed in OECD countries and even in other
transition economies (see Russian Economic Trends (1995-99)). The three
primary non-monetary means of payment have been barter, inter…rm arrears
(or o¤sets) and promissory notes (vecksels). Inter…rm arrears emerged dur-
ing high-in‡ation in 1992-94. Since stabilization in 1995 they went down but
did not entirely disappear. Barter and promissory notes have become major
means of payment after stabilization in 1995. According to various sources,
barter accounts for 30 to 80 per cent of inter…rm transactions (Aukutzionek
(1998), Karpov (1997), Hendley et al. (1998)). Data on promissory notes are
scarce but some estimates indicate that they account for 10-20 per cent of
inter…rm transactions with total volume being as large as 10 per cent GDP
(Voitkova (1999)).1
The demonetization of this depth is unprecedented in modern economic
history. The mainstream economic theory of money has explained why barter
is crowded out by …at money in all developed economies. Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989), Williamson and Wright (1994), Banerjee and Maskin (1996)
build general equilibrium models with asymmetric information and/or ran-
dom matching to show that introduction of a universal medium of exchange
can increase welfare. Money is considered to be a superior mode of exchange.
Russia’s demonetization experience is therefore a challenge to modern eco-
nomics. We have to answer precisely the opposite question: why has barter
crowded out the monetary exchange?
There is a number of competing answers to this question. Most managers
maintain the view that barter is explained by liquidity squeeze due to tight
monetary policy. The second reason is often brought up by government o¢-
cials who say that barter is used to avoid paying taxes in full. Third, outside
investors often claim that managers use barter to divert pro…ts, entrench and
delay restructuring.
Ellingsen (1998) and Marin and Schnitzer (1999) have suggested that
barter in Russia may emerge as a response to contractual imperfections.
1In our survey, 40 per cent of sales are paid in kind and 10 per cent are paid in vecksels.
2Ellingsen (1998) builds a model in which liquidity-constrained agents signal
their type via payments in kind. Marin and Schnitzer (1999) assume that
barter helps to enforce debt contracts since barter can be used as a hostage.2
Thus barter makes possible exchange between liquidity constrained …rms in
an environment with costly contracting.
Gaddy and Ickes (1999) suggest that barter is a natural substitute for
restructuring. In their model, managers can invest their time either in ’re-
lational’ capital which facilitates barter within existing trading networks or
into ’restructuring’ which makes it possible to sell the …rm’s products in new
markets. Therefore growth of barter should be negatively correlated with
restructuring.
We believe that discussion of barter in Russiais incomplete withouttaking
into account the role of market structure. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
these are the natural monopolies that are most engaged in barter (Gaddy
and Ickes (1998b)). Gazprom (the natural gas monopoly) and RAO UES
(the electricity monopoly) have reported cash receipts low as 10 per cent
of total revenue (after 1998 devaluation, the share of cash in RAO UES’s
revenues has gone up to 40 per cent). The rest has been paid in vecksels,
coal, metal, machinery and even jet …ghters.
In this paper, we build a model of barter as a means of price discrimi-
nation that predicts a positive correlation between concentration of market
power and share of barter in sales. The argument that barter can be used as
a means of price discrimination is certainly not new. Caves and Marin (1992)
analyze the countertrade between Western and second and third world coun-
tries. They show that price discrimination may be responsible for wide use
of countertrade transactions in the global economy.3 Our model is di¤erent
from Caves and Marin’s in several respects. First, we provide a closed model
of an imperfectly competitive industry and solve for the partial equilibrium
taking into account responses of all sellers and buyers in the market. Second,
there is an important distinction between international and domestic barter.
In foreign trade, it is usually possible to separate markets. In domestic sales,
there is a single market and only incentive-compatible discrimination is fea-
sible.
2Though often criticized, such an assumption is not uncommon in modern …nancial
economics. E.g. Myers and Rajan (1998) assume that the more liquid assets are, the
greater the ’transformation’ (i.e. diversion) risk is.
3See also Ellingsen and Stole (1996) who suggest that international barter may be a
device to commit not to engage into unilateral imports.
3The main result of our analysis is that barter can indeed emerge in equi-
librium as a means of price discrimination even if there are no liquidity
constraints. Our model predicts that barter is more likely to occur in con-
centrated industries and decreases with competition. Moreover, there is a
threshold level of competition at which barter disappears altogether. These
predictions are empirically testable. We use a survey of Russian …rms in
order to check whether our model is consistent with data.
Until recently, empirical work on barter in Russia and other transition
economies has been scarce. In the last year or two, however, a number of
independent surveys has been conducted. Based on the collected data, quite
a few authors have tried to measure barter and to test various theories of
barter. The work can be roughly classi…ed into two large classes. The …rst
approach is to ask managers how much they barter and why they barter and
try to regress their answers on their perceptions of their …rms’ characteristics
such as indebtedness, competitiveness, access to markets etc. This approach
is used in Commander and Mumssen (1998), Carlin et al. (forthcoming),
Brana and Maurel (1999), Marin and Schnitzer (1999). Commander and
Mummsen (1998) and Carlin et al. …nd that barter is related to …nancial
di¢culties. Tax evasion and corporate governance problems are not reported
by managers as primary causes of barter. Brana and Maurel (1999) use
panel data to show that the explanation of barter is di¤erent for pro…table
and loss-making …rms. Potentially viable …rms use barter to relax liquidity
constraints while highly indebted …rms take advantage of barter to avoid
restructuring. Marin and Schnitzer (1999) use data on barter prices and …nd
support for their model that barter serves as a hostage to build trust among
liquidity-constrained trading parties.
The other approach to empirical analysis of barter is to ask managers
how much they barter and match their answers with o¢cial statistics on
their …rms. This approach allows to get rid of bias introduced by manager’s
imperfect information and lack of incentives to reveal sensitive information.
In particular, Guriev and Ickes (forthcoming) use this approach to test the
liquidity hypothesis. Indeed, if …rm A says that …rm B pays her in kind
because B has no money, A may be mislead since she does not have complete
information on B’s …nancial standing. Guriev and Ickes test whether share of
in-kind payments for inputs depends on …rm’s liquidity and …nd no signi…cant
relationship. It would also be very interesting to apply this approach to
testing tax evasion and corporate governance theories. Unfortunately, unlike
the …nancial accounts, data on unpaid taxes and con‡icts between managers
4and owners are very hard to get.
In this paper, we have chosen the second approach. Unlike Carlin et al.
(forthcoming) and Caves and Marin (1992) we measure competition directly
through concentration ratios rather than via managers’ perception of com-
petition.4 We …nd that barter is indeed correlated with concentration. We
also test our hypotheses about structural break due to abrupt disappearance
of barter when competition crosses certain threshold. We …nd the critical
level of concentration and show that the structural change is indeed present
in the data and consistent with our model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build a simple
model of price-discriminating monopoly which is then extended to the case
of oligopoly. Section 3 contains results of our empirical analysis. Section 4
concludes.
2 The model
In this Section we shall study a simple model of barter as a screening device
for price discrimination. In Subsection 2.1 we start with a standard model
of a monopoly selling to a continuum of buyers. We introduce notation
and make technical assumptions. In the Subsection 2.2, we add barter. In
Subsection 2.3 we extend the analysis for the case of oligopoly and solve for
Cournot equilibria.
2.1 The setting
Consider a monopoly seller S that supplies an input to a continuum of buyers
B (industrial …rms). The marginal cost of the input is constant and equal to
c 2 [0;1]. Each buyer has a linear technology which converts a unit of the
input into one unit of output worth v to the buyer. The buyer’s maximum
capacity is one unit. The buyer’s outside option is zero so that buyers add
value whenever v > c and destroy value if v < c:
We assume that v is distributed on [0;1] with c.d.f. F(v). The buyer’s
type v is her private information, but the distribution function F(¢) is com-
4Carlin et al. use two measures. First, they ask managers how many competitors
they have. Second, they ask about price elasticity of demand for the …rm’s products.
Their empirical analysis provide weak evidence for positive correlation between barter and
concentration.
5mon knowledge. The timing is as follows: S o¤ers a menu of contracts, the
buyer learns her type and chooses which contract to take.








Assumption A1. Density f(v) = F0(v) is continuous and positive. v ¡
G(v) is an increasing function of v: The hazard ratio f(v)=(1 ¡ F(v)) is a
non-decreasing function of v:
This assumption is satis…ed whenever distribution is su¢ciently close to
uniform. For the uniform distribution F(v) = v; G(v) = v=2; v¡G(v) = v=2;
f(v)=(1 ¡ F(v)) = 1=(1 ¡ v):
First, let us describe the social optimum. The …rst best is to supply the
input to the buyers with v ¸ c and shut down all the others. This outcome
would be implemented if the input market were perfectly competitive. The
price of the input would then be set equal to its marginal cost c: Only buyers
with v ¸ c would buy the input and produce. Total social welfare would be R 1
c (v ¡ c)f(v)dv:
In the second best, the seller o¤ers a menu of contractsf(p;q)g: buy
q 2 [0;1] units of input and pay p in cash. If a buyer with quality v picks
a contract (p;q) her utility is vq ¡ p while the seller gets p ¡ cq. According
to the Revelation Principle we can re-formulate the problem as follows: the
monopoly o¤ers a menu of contracts fp(v);q(v)g; v 2 [0;1] such that each
type v selects a contract f(p(v);q(v))g: The seller maximizes
Z 1
0
(p(v) ¡ cq(v))dF(v) (2)
subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality constraints
vq(v) ¡ p(v) ¸ vq(v
0) ¡ p(v
0); vq(v) ¡ p(v) ¸ 0 for all v;v
0 2 [0;1]
A straightforward analysis of this adverse selection problem (see Salanie
(1997)) gives








6The seller o¤ers only two contracts f(pm;1);(0;0)g.5 The price pm solves
p
m ¡ c = (1 ¡ F(p
m))=f(p
m): (3)
All buyers with v ¸ pm will buy and produce and the others will not.6 The
deadweight loss Z pm
c
(v ¡ c)f(v)dv (4)
arises due to the fact that buyers with v 2 (c;pm) that could potentially add
value, do not produce: This equilibrium is essentially a textbook case of a
monopoly serving a market with demand curve Q = 1 ¡ F(p):
2.2 Barter as a means of price discrimination
Now we shall introduce in-kind payments. Suppose that the seller can o¤er
the buyers a menu of triples f(p;b;q)g: buy q 2 [0;1] units of input for cash
payment p and in-kind payment b 2 f0;1g: If b = 1; the buyer’s output is
given to the seller. It is important to emphasize that unlike money, the barter
is indivisible. In this model we follow the strategy of introducing all possible
shortcomings of barter in order to show that in the presence of market power
barter can emerge even if it is very ine¢cient.
Another drawback of barter is the need for double coincidence of wants.
We assume that seller values the buyer’s output less than the buyer. A unit
of buyer v’s product is worth only ®v to S, where 0 < ® < 1: This assumption
implies that the seller has an inferior technology for re-selling or using the
buyer’s product relative to the buyer herself.7 The cost of barter 1 ¡ ® may
be interpreted as a probability that there is no double coincidence of wants
so that S has to throw the in-kind payments away.
If the buyer v chooses a contract (p;b;q), she gets the payo¤ vq(1¡b)¡p.
The seller gets (®vb ¡ c)q + p: The optimal menu of contracts f(p;b;q)g
maximizes
5The intuition for the corner solution is simple: both B and S are risk-neutral and their
valuations of the input are linear in quantity. In the equilibrium, there are no contracts
with q 2 (0;1).
6Hereinafter we assume that whenever indi¤erent, the buyers choose to buy the input
and produce.
7A more general approach would be to assume that the value of buyer v’s output to
the seller is an arbitrary function ®(v) where ®(v) · v: We have checked some alternative




(p(v) + ®vb(v)q(v) ¡ cq(v))f(v)dv (5)
subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality constraints
0 · v(1 ¡ b(v))q(v) ¡ p(v) ¸ v(1 ¡ b(v
0))q(v
0) ¡ p(v
0) for all v;v
0 2 [0;1]
In order to characterize the solution, we shall introduce more notation. De-
note pmb; p¤ that solve
p
mb(1 ¡ ®) = (1 ¡ F(p
mb))=f(p
mb); ®G(p
¤) = c; (6)
respectively.
Proposition 1 The optimal menu of contracts f(p;b;q)g is as follows. There
exists ¹ c such that if c < ¹ c; S chooses to use barter and o¤ers the following
menu of contracts: f(pmb;0;1);(0;1;1);(0;0;0)g:8 If c > ¹ c S chooses not to
use barter and o¤ers the couple f(pm;0;1);(0;0;0)g where pm solves (3):
The intuition is again simple. Since both seller’s and buyers’ preferences
are linear in the quantity, there are no contracts with q between zero and
one.
Example. Consider a uniform distribution f(p) = 1: In this case ¹ c =
(1 ¡ ®=2)¡1=2 ¡ 1; pmb = (2 ¡ ®)¡1; pm = (1 + c)=2; p¤ = 2c=®:
Further on, we will only study the case where monopoly is better-o¤ using
barter.
Assumption A2. The monopoly is better-o¤ using barter: c < ¹ c:
This assumption is satis…ed if marginal cost of production is not too high.
We believe that it is quite appropriate for Russian economy in transition.
Most Russian …rms produce well under capacity. Neither capital nor labor
are fully utilized.
A2 implies pmb > p¤. Indeed, we have the following chain of inequalities:
(pmb ¡ c)(1 ¡ F(pmb)) + (®G(pmb) ¡ c)F(pmb) > (pm ¡ c)(1 ¡ F(pm)) =
8This menu is similar to a standard debt contract. The constract says: ’S supplies a
unit of input to B; B must pay S pmb in cash or S gets ownership of B’s output’. The
barter trade is therefore similar to (ine¢cient) liquidation. Unlike conventional models of
debt (Hart (1995)), we assume that there is no possibility for ex post renegotiation (or
that the renegotiation is very costly). The model with renegotiation where the buyer has
at least some bargaining power has a very similar equilibrium, except of course elimination
of deadweight loss due to the double coincidence of wants.
8maxp f(p ¡ c)(1 ¡ F(p))g ¸ (pmb ¡ c)(1 ¡ F(pmb)). Therefore (®G(pmb) ¡
c)F(pmb) > 0. It is not surprising: the monopoly prefers to use barter only if
the average value of payments in kind is better than the marginal cost. The
other implication of A2 is that the monetary price is higher in the presence
of barter: pmb > pm: Indeed, the seller’s pro…t function (p ¡ c)(1 ¡ F(p)) +
(®G(p)¡c)F(p) increases at p = pm. The …rst term (p¡c)(1¡F(p)) is the
pro…t collected in the cash market which is maximized at p = pm and the
second term increases with p: The intuition is simple: if there were no barter,
raising the cash price would result in losing customers, while in the presence
of barter, these customers are not lost — they switch to paying in kind.
The welfare e¤ect of barter is ambiguous.. The deadweight loss in the
equilibrium with barter is (1 ¡ ®)G(pmb)+ (c ¡ G(c))F(c) which may be
greater or less than the deadweight loss (4) would be if barter contracts were
prohibited. There are two sources of ine¢ciency. First, the direct ine¢ciency
of barter is due to the fact that the seller gets the good that she does not
need as much as the buyer ® < 1. Second, some ine¢cient buyers with v < c
get the input and produce. These two e¤ects may be either larger or smaller
than the deadweight loss (4) without barter that is caused by underprovision
of the input by the monopoly seller.
This simple model illustrates the relevant policy trade-o¤s. If barter were
prohibited, a monopoly would produce too little, some e¢cient buyers would
close down. However, if barter is allowed, the losses are not only due to the
lack of double coincidence of wants (proportional to 1 ¡ ®). There are also
losses due to the asymmetric information about the quality of payments in
kind. The value of the barter payments is greater than the cost of input they
are made of: ®G(pmb) > c on average. Some of the buyers who get the input
and produce are not e¢cient. Thus the model rather supports the claim
that barter helps non-pro…table …rms survive and delay restructuring since
they are pooled together with pro…table ones in the barter market. This is
an implication of indivisibility of barter. If barter payments were perfectly
divisible, the seller would be able to discriminate against the most ine¢cient
buyers.
2.3 Barter in oligopoly
Let us now extend our analysis to oligopoly. Suppose that there are N
identical sellers with the same marginal cost c. We will look at the Cournot
oligopoly assuming that sellers determine how much to sell for cash and for
9barter taking into account change in the monetary market price in response to
change in their supply decision. Each …rm sells qi for cash at the market price
p and ri for the buyers’ output. In equilibrium, total quantity supplied to the
cash market Q =
PN
i=1qi equals quantity demanded
R 1
p f(v)dv = 1 ¡ F(p):
The rest of buyers v < p buy in the barter market paying with their output
so that each seller expects to get ri®G(p). Since buyers in the barter market
are indi¤erent between buying and not buying we assume that if total supply
in the barter market R =
PN
i=1 ri is below F(p), the demand is stochastically
rationed so that the average quality of payments in kind remains ®G(p).
The seller i takes other seller’s strategies qj and rj as given and maximizes
¼(qi;q¡i;ri) = p(qi + q¡i)qi + ri®G(p) ¡ cqi ¡ cri (7)
subject to
0 · ri · 1 ¡ (qi + q¡i) ¡ r¡i: (8)
Here q¡i =
P
j6=i qj, r¡i =
P
j6=irj. The inverse demand function p(Q) is
given by Q = 1 ¡ F(p):
Formally, we shall look for Nash equilibria in the game among N sellers
whose strategies are couples (qi;ri) that satisfy (8) and qi ¸ 0: The payo¤s
are given by (7).9
We will classify equilibria by the presence of barter and then carry out
comparative statics analysis with regard to N:10 Notice that …rm i has an
incentive to sell for barter whenever @¼=@ri = ®G(p) ¡ c ¸ 0 or p ¸ p¤:
1. ’Barter’ equilibria. This is the case where p ¸ p¤: The objective func-
tion increases with ri: Therefore the sellers want to barter as much as
possible ri = 1 ¡ (qi + q¡i) ¡ r¡i: The …rst order condition for qi im-
plies qi = f(p)[p ¡ ®G(p) ¡ ®(p ¡ G(p))(F(p) ¡ r¡i)=F(p)]:11 Adding
up for i = 1;::;N and dividing by f(p) we obtain the equation for
equilibrium price




9Strictly speaking, we have not de…ned a game in the normal form, since other players’
strategies in‡uence both payo¤ function and the set of possible strategies for each player.
However, we can easily reformulate the problem setting payo¤ equal to (7) if (8) is satis…ed
and ¡1 otherwise.
10In this stylized model we take N to be a positive real number. However, at N = 1 the
equilibria will indeed coincide with the ones in case of monopoly.
11We have used the identity G0(p) = (p ¡ G(p))f(p)=F(p):
10We will denote pb(N) the price p that solves (9) for a given N: The
necessary and su¢cient condition for existence of a barter equilibrium
is pb(N) ¸ p¤: The total amount of barter sales is R = F(pb(N)). The
barter sales of individual sellers ri must satisfy
PN
i=1ri = R: In the
symmetric equilibrium ri = F(pb)=N and qi = (1¡F(pb))=N: There is
also a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. In all equilibria, however,
p and R are the same.
2. ’No-barter’ equilibria. If p · p¤; the sellers do not barter ri = 0 and
the …rst order condition for qi implies qi = (p¡c)f(p): Adding up and
dividing by f(p) we get the conventional Cournot equilibrium




Let us introduce pnb(N) as a solution to (10). The necessary and su¢-
cient condition for existence of a no-barter equilibrium is pnb(N) · p¤:
The total amount of barter sales is zero.
3. ’Rationed barter’ equilibria. If p = p¤; the sellers are indi¤erent about
how much to o¤er for barter. The …rst order condition for qi implies
qi = (p¤ ¡ c)f(p¤) ¡ ri(p ¡ G(p))f(p)=F(p): Adding up, we get
R=F(p
¤) = [(p





Barter sales of individual sellers ri must satisfy
PN
i=1ri = R: The neces-
sary and su¢cient condition for existence of a rationed-barter equilib-
rium is (8) i.e. 0 · R=F(p¤) · 1: These inequalities hold if and only if
both inequalities pb(N) ¸ p¤ and pnb(N) · p¤ hold. Thus the rationed
barter equilibrium exists if and only if both ’barter’ and ’no-barter’
equilibria exist.
Let us denote Nb a solution to pb(N) = p¤ and Nnb a solution to pnb(N) =
p¤:
Proposition 2 Assume A1-A2. Both Nb and Nnb exist and Nb > Nnb. The
set of equilibria of the game above is as follows:












Figure 1: Oligopoly price p as function of number of sellers N:
2. If N > Nb then there is a unique stable equilibrium which is a no-barter
equilibrium
3. If N 2 (Nnb;Nb) then there are three equilibria two of which (barter
and no-barter) are stable and one (rationed barter) is unstable.
4. If N = Nb then there are two equilibria: a stable one (no-barter) and
an unstable one (barter).
5. If N = Nnb then there are two equilibria: a stable one (barter) and an
unstable one (no-barter).
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of equilibria according to Proposition 2.
The intuition for multiplicity of equilibria at N 2 (Nnb;Nb) is as follows.
Whenever one seller chooses to sell more for cash, she drives down the cash










Figure 2: Share of barter sales in total sales B = R=(R+Q) as a function of
number of sellers N:
were initially the most e¢cient ones among those buying for barter. With
these buyers leaving the barter market, the average quality of payments in
kind goes down. Thus other sellers will have incentives to sell more for cash
and less for barter.12
It it interesting to see how share of barter in sales in the industry B =
R=(R+Q) changes with number of sellers N: In the barter equilibria B = R =
F(pb(N)). Since pb(N) is a continuous decreasing function, y is a continuous
decreasing function of N: In the no-barter equilibria B = R = 0: In the
rationed barter equilibria Q = 1 ¡ F(p¤); R is a linear function of N given
by (11). Therefore B = [1 + (1 ¡ F(p¤))=R]
¡1 is a continuous increasing
hyperbolic function of N that connects points (Nnb;0) and (Nb;F(p¤)) in
12This externality is somewhat similar to aggregate demand externality in the new
Keynesian macroeconomics.
13the (N;B) space (see Figure 2).
Let us brie‡y discuss what properties of the model determine the struc-
ture of equilibria. First, both in barter and no-barter equilibria, prices go
down if number of sellers increases. Second, for a given number of sellers,
the cash price in barter equilibrium is greater than the price in no-barter
equilibrium. This is also intuitive. In barter equilibria, sellers have more in-
centives to charge higher prices because the marginal buyers who would leave
the market in case of no-barter equilibria, now simply switch to barter and
therefore contribute to pro…ts from barter sales. Third, in barter equilibria
the cash price should be above certain level p¤ otherwise the average qual-
ity of payments in kind is below marginal cost and barter is not pro…table.
Similarly, in no-barter equilibria price should be below p¤: Under these three
conditions, the structure of equilibria should be exactly like in Figures 1 and
2.
In the no-barter equilibria, the deadweight loss occurs since the cash
price is higher than the marginal cost. Therefore some e¢cient buyers do
not buy and produce. In the barter equilibria, all buyers produce including
the value-subtracting ones. Also, there are transactions costs of barter (1 ¡
®)F(pb(N))G(pb(N)). The social planner has to compare the deadweight
loss of a no-barter equilibrium where too many …rms are shut down but
transaction costs are low with that of barter equilibrium where too few …rms
are shut down and transactions costs are high.
3 Empirical analysis
The model implies the following empirical predictions. First, the greater
the market concentration 1=N; the greater the level of barter in sales B =
R=(R+ Q): Second, if the industry is su¢ciently competitive (1=N < 1=Nb)
the barter disappears altogether. Third, there should be a structural break in
the range 1=N 2 [1=Nb;1=Nnb] where the industry jumps from the no-barter
equilibrium to the full-barter equilibrium.
3.1 The data
We use the dataset ’Barter in Russian industrial …rms’ built in the New
Economic School Research Project ’Non-Monetary Transactions in Russian
Economy’. This dataset was created by matching the surveys of managers
14of Russian industrial …rms conducted in 1996-98 by Serguei Tsoukhlo (In-
stitute of Economies in Transition, Moscow) with Goskomstat database of
Russian …rms (Federal Committee of Statistics of Russian Federation). Since
Goskomstat data were most complete for 1996 and 1997 we ran regressions
for 1996 and 1997 data.
The barter data included six to seven hundred …rms each year. The
barter data are answers of …rms’ managers to the following (eight) questions:
’how much of your …rm’s inputs (outputs) were paid in rubles, in dollars,
in kind and in promissory notes?’ The Goskomstat database includes com-
pulsory statistical reports that all large and medium-size …rms must submit
to Russian Federal Statistics Committee. There are over 16 thousand …rms
in the database. After matching barter data with the Goskomstat data we
ended up with 987 observations with 475 (48%) in 1996 and 512 in 1997.
Among these, 264 …rms appeared both in 1996 and 1997.
The concentration ratios CR4 (share of four biggest …rms in total sales
of an industry) were calculated for 5-digit OKONKh industries (more than
three hundred industries) using the Goskomstat database.13 In our sample,
some industries are not represented so that we have on average 4 …rms in
each industry, with up to 30 …rms in some industries. Given the average
CR4 in these industries is almost 40 per cent, this is quite a few. An al-
ternative approach would be to calculate CR4s for broader (e.g. 4-digit)
industries. However, we believe that such concentration ratios are less infor-
mative. In Russia’s OKONKh classi…cation many 4-digit industries include
5-digit industries that use each other’s outputs as inputs in their production.
Therefore …rms in such 4-digit industries do not compete with each other.
3.2 Empirical results
The main regression we have run was an OLS regression of B (share of barter
in sales) on CR4 (concentration ratio in the …rm’s industry) and a proxy of
size ls (logarithm of sales in thousands of non-denominated rubles). We have
included the proxy for size into our regression because there should evidently
be economies of scale in using barter. In terms of our model, the greater the
…rm is, the less the transaction costs of barter 1¡® are. We have also tried
other measures of size such as employment and got similar results.
13We thank David Brown and Annette Brown for providing us with the concentration
ratios they have calculated. The CR4s they have obtained coincide with ones that Federal
Antimonopoly Committee has included in its Annual Report.
15Since our model applies to inter…rm transactions we need to control for
sales to foreign and retail customers. The former is easy to measure: we shall
use share of exports in sales export (we have also tried share of non-CIS ex-
ports in sales and results were similar). It is less clear how to control for
retail sales. As a proxy for sales to consumers we have used a consumer good
industry dummy (CGI). We set CGI = 1 for consumer good industries and
CGI = 0 otherwise. In our sample, 28% …rms are in consumer good indus-
tries. Unfortunately, CGI is a very crude estimate of a …rm’s exposure to
consumer market and is in fact industry-speci…c rather than …rm-speci…c.14
Also, even producers of consumer goods are not necessarily selling directly
to consumers or even to retail trade. This is why one should be careful
with interpretation of regressions with CGI: However, we shall include CGI
into regression since it can help us control for an alternative explanation of
positive correlation between concentration and barter. In consumer good
industries there are many small …rms, and all …rms receive cash from indi-
vidual consumers (or retail trade). In the intermediate good industries, the
minimum e¢ciency scale is high, there are fewer …rms and they supply to
other …rms (or wholesale trade) who are willing to pay in kind. Thus, if we
assume that the farther from the retail market the less cash is paid, there
should be a positive correlation between distance from the consumer market
and barter. Since there is also a positive correlation between the distance to
market and concentration, barter and concentration should be correlated.
We have not included other industry dummies into regressions. The main
idea of our theory is that all industries are alike and the only thing that
matters is the market structure. We have introduced the following regional
dummies: rgmsk = 1 if the …rm is based in Moscow, rgural = 1 if the …rm
is based in Urals, rgasia = 1 if the …rm is based in Siberia or Far East.
The base category is European Russia except Moscow. The variable year97
equals 0 if the observation belongs to 1996 survey and 1 if it is from 1997
survey.
The summary statistics and the correlation matrix are shown in the Ap-
pendix A. There is no multi-collinearity.. The signs of pair-wise correlations
are intuitive. There is more barter in larger …rms, in concentrated indus-
tries and in those who sell less to foreign customers and consumers. There is
14The latest data we have for production of consumer goods by each …rm date back to
1993. In 1993, share of consumers goods in output were indeed correlated with CGI. In
consumer good industries CGI = 1; the share of consumer goods was 48 per cent while in
the other industries it was only 13 per cent.
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CR4 0.08***(0.03) 0.06**(0.03) 0.05*(0.03) 0.03(0.03)
ls 0.016***(0.004) 0.014***(0.004)
export -0.13***(0.05) -0.13***(0.05) -0.17***(0.05)
CGI -0.09***(0.02) -0.09***(0.02)
yr97 0.04**(0.01) 0.03**(0.01) 0.03**(0.01) 0.03**(0.01)
rgmsk -0.20***(0.02) -0.20***(0.02) -0.19***(0.02) -0.19***(0.02)
rgural 0.15***(0.03) 0.14***(0.03) 0.17*** (0.03) 0.15***(0.03)
rgasia 0.08***(0.03) 0.07***(0.03) 0.09***(0.03) 0.08***(0.03)
const 0.35***(0.02) 0.10(0.07) 0.39***(0.02) 0.16**(0.07)
N 987 987 987 987
R2 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.16
Table 1: OLS regression results. ¤¤¤ signi…cant at 1% level, ¤¤ 5% level, ¤
10% level.
slightly more barter in 1997 than in 1996 (see Guriev and Ickes (1999) for the
analysis of dynamic economies of scale in barter). Consumer good industries
are less concentrated. Average CR4 for consumer good industries is 25 per
cent which is signi…cantly lower than in the other industries (42 per cent).
There is more barter in Siberia and Urals and less barter in Moscow.
The results of the basic OLS regressions are shown in Table 1.
In most speci…cations, share of barter positively and signi…cantly depends
on concentration. When we include CGI into regression, the e¤ect of concen-
tration decreases and may even become insigni…cant. Therefore, the evidence
corroborates the theory that there is less barter in consumer markets.15
In order to test for the structural break we have introduced a dummy D
that takes the value of 1 if CR4 < CR4¤ and D = 0 otherwise. Then we
added a term D¤CR4 to our regression. The coe¢cient on CR4 would then
show the e¤ect of concentration for industries with CR4 > CR4¤. The e¤ect
of concentration for competitive industries CR4 < CR4¤ would be equal to
the sum of coe¢cients on CR4 and D ¤ CR4:
To …nd the cuto¤ point CR4¤ we have calculated the Andrews statistic
(Andrews, 1993) for every CR4¤ 2 [0:03;0:75]. Figure 3 shows that the
15On the other hand, the impact of CGI and export variables can also be interpreted
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Figure 3: Andrews’ statistic as a function of the suspected structural change
point CR4¤. The maximum is reached at CR4¤ = 0:1616:
statistic reaches maximum at CR4¤ = 0:1616. At this point the statistic
equals 18.11 which is well above the asymptotic critical value 6.8 calculated
in Andrews (1993). There is another local maximum at CR4¤ = 0:2504
but there the statistic equals or only marginally exceeds the critical value.
Therefore the structural change is most likely to occur at CR4¤ = 0:1616. In
our sample, 27% observations are in the industries with CR4 < 0:1616:
The results of the regressions with the structural change are presented in
the Table 2.
The results are fully consistent with our model. If concentration is greater
than the cuto¤ level, the coe¢cient on CR4 is positive and signi…cant but
small (0:10). However if concentration is below the cuto¤ level, the coe¢cient
on concentration is positive, signi…cant and much greater (0.93=0.83+0.10).
In terms of Fig.4 (which is essentially Fig.2 redrawn in (1=N;B) coordinates),
the coe¢cient 0:10 is the slope of the barter equilibria curve, while 0:93
represents the abrupt jump from barter equilibria curve down to no-barter
equilibria curve.
Another way to test the prediction that barter disappears with an increase
in competition is to run probit regressions. We have generated a binary
variable b0 that takes the value of 1 whenever B = 0 and zero if B = 0: In
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CR4 0.12***(0.03) 0.10***(0.03) 0.11***(0.03) 0.10***(0.03)
D ¤ CR4 0.50**(0.12) 0.54**(0.21) 0.54**(0.21) 0.83***(0.21)
ls 0.014***(0.004) 0.017***(0.004) 0.015***(0.004)
CGI -0.10***(0.02)
export -0.13***(0.05) -0.17***(0.05)
yr97 0.04**(0.01) 0.03**(0.01) 0.03**(0.01) 0.03**(0.01)
rgmsk -0.20***(0.02) -0.20***(0.03) -0.20***(0.02) -0.18***(0.02)
rgural 0.15***(0.03) 0.14***(0.03) 0.14***(0.03) 0.15***(0.03)
rgasia 0.08***(0.03) 0.07***(0.03) 0.07***(0.02) 0.08***(0.03)
const 0.32***(0.02) 0.10(0.07) 0.06(0.08) 0.11(0.07)
N 987 987 987 987
R2 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.17
Table 2: OLS regressions with structural change. *** denotes signi…cance at
1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level.
 0 1/N
b   1/N
nb            1/N





Figure 4: Share of barter in sales B as function of concentration 1=N. At
certain concentration below 1=Nb there occurs an abrupt jump from barter
to no-barter equilibrium. At concentrations above 1=Nb, industries are in
the barter equilibrium.
19b0 b0 b1 b2
CR4 0.41*(0.22) 0.25(0.23) 0.38*(0.21) 0.29*(0.17)
ls 0.07***(0.03) 0.08***(0.03) 0.08***(0.03)
rgmsk -0.85***(0.15) -0.94***(0.14) -1.00***(0.14)
const 1.16***(0.09) 0.14(0.55) -0.21(0.51) -0.71(0.44)
N 987 987 987 987
Ps. R2 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.07
Table 3: Probit estimates.
our sample, only 10% …rms have zero barter. The results are reported in
Table 3. The probability to have barter increases with concentration. The
coe¢cient is marginally signi…cant and becomes insigni…cant whenever we
control for other factors. Our theory predicts that probability to have barter
increases with size for size is a proxy for the parameter ®: Year dummies and
regional dummies except Moscow are not signi…cant.
It is also of interest to check whether concentration has any impact on
probability to have very low barter share rather than zero barter share. In-
deed, occasional barter deals occur in OECD economies as well. We have
looked at two cuto¤ points 0:1 and 0:2. In our sample, 13% …rms have share
of barter in sales below 10% and 27% of the …rms have the barter share below
0:2. We have introduced two binary variables b1 and b2. The binary variable
b1 is 1 whenever B < 0:1 and 0 otherwise. Similarly, b2 = 1 when B < 0:2
and b2 = 0 otherwise. The results of probit estimates with cuto¤ levels are
also shown in Table 3. The probability to have very low barter decreases
with concentration as well as the probability to have no barter at all. The
e¤ect of concentration is more signi…cant for probability to have very low
barter rather than probability of zero barter.
The pairwise correlation between concentration and bi is also stronger for
b1 and b2 than for b0: We have run t-tests and found that concentration is on
average 5-6% lower for …rms with bi = 1, but the di¤erence is signi…cant at
1% level for b1 and b2 but not for b0:
4 Conclusions and policy implications
Let us summarize our results. We have developed a simple model of barter
as a means of price discrimination. In our model, buyers are not liquidity
20constrained and are able to pay cash for their inputs. Also, there is no double
coincidence of wants so that the barter transactions are less e¢cient than the
monetary ones. The buyers do need the sellers’ product but the sellers do
not need the buyers’. The value of the buyer’s output to the seller is only
® < 1 of its value to the buyer. Second, we assume that barter is indivisible.
In the asymmetric information framework this assumption leads to ine¢cient
pooling in the barter market. Since the quality of payments in kind is not
observable, ine¢cient buyers will be engaged in barter along with the e¢cient
ones.
Our main result is that even with all these de…ciencies, barter can emerge
in equilibrium if the markets are su¢ciently concentrated. The amount of
barter increases with concentration. The intuition is straightforward. Since
equilibria under imperfect competition are usually characterized by under-
production relative to the social optimum, sellers may be interested in an
additional channel of sales even if this channel is costly.
In order to test predictions of the model, we have built a unique dataset.
We matched a survey of managers’ on the degree of barter in their …rms with
o¢cial statistical …rm-level data. The empirical analysis supports our model.
Barter positively and signi…cantly depends on the concentration especially
in a model with a structural break that our theory predicts.
Our result raises a legitimate question. If barter is explained by high
concentration of market power, why is it observed in Russia and is virtually
non-existent in other economies? One answer to this question would be that
in Russia markets are more concentrated than in other economies. This claim
is well-accepted by general public and policymakers but is not supported by
data (see Brown et al. (1994), Brown and Brown, (1998)). Our model may
o¤er another explanation. For the same level of concentration there may be
two stable equilibria: one with barter and one without barter. Therefore
there may be path-dependence. In 1995, a liquidity shock has thrown the
economy into a high barter state. Since that time, price ‡exibility should
have restored equilibrium level of real money stock. The real money supply,
however, is now 2 to 3 times as low as it used to be. In terms of Polterovitch
(1998), Russian economy is in the institutional trap of barter.
The multiple equilibria argument is rather common in modern literature
on transition and development. It is basically the essence of so-called ’post-
Washington consensus’ that is gradually replacing the Washington consensus
on economic transition. The post-Washington consensus states that institu-
tions matter a great deal for economic transition and may fail to emerge
21spontaneously. Government should intervene to promote good institutions,
otherwise the economy will …nd itself in a low-level equilibrium. However,
what our model suggests is not simply a restatement that Russia may be in
a low-level equilibrium. We have shown that at some level of competition
the barter equilibrium disappears and industry jumps to the no-barter equi-
librium. This argument suggests non-trivial policy implications. In order to
reduce barter, government should promote competition. Moreover, even if
competition policy may have had a little e¤ect on barter so far, government
should not give up. Our model (along with empirical analysis) suggests that
barter may fall dramatically when certain threshold level of competition is
achieved.
The other question is whether policymakers should …ght barter. We show
that from the social planner’s point of view the trade-o¤ is as follows. Under
imperfect competition, the no-barter equilibrium is characterized by under-
production: many e¢cient …rms close down. The barter equilibrium is too
soft, all e¢cient …rms produce but so do the ine¢cient ones. Also, the barter
equilibrium is characterized by high transaction costs. Our model provides
no unambiguous answer which equilibrium is more e¢cient. On the other
hand, the model clearly predicts that policymakers who are more concerned
with excess employment would rather choose the barter equilibrium as one
with less …rm closures and mass redundancies. This may explain why local
politicians encourage barter relatively more often than the federal govern-
ment. Certainly, our model is not a general equilibrium model and it does
not take it into some important negative consequences of barter. Widespread
barter reduces transparency in the economy which in turns leads to worse
corporate governance, lower tax collection and greater corruption.
22Appendix A: Tables
Table A1. Summary statistics.
Variable Explanation Mean Std.Dev Min Max
B Share of barter in sales 0.39 0.24 0 0.83
ls Log sales 17.13 1.76 9.10 22.27
CR4 5-digit concentration 0.38 0.26 0.04 1
export Share of export in sales 0.07 0.16 0 0.97
CGI Consumer good industry 0.28 0.45 0 1
rgmsk Moscow 0.10 0.31 0 1
rgural Urals 0.06 0.23 0 1
rgasia Siberia and Far East 0.09 0.29 0 1
Table A2. The correlation matrix (*** denotes signi…cance at 1% level).
B ls CR4 export CGI year97
B 1
ls 0.14¤¤¤ 1
CR4 0.11¤¤¤ 0.25¤¤¤ 1
export -0.02 0.28¤¤¤ 0.20¤¤¤ 1
CGI -0.18¤¤¤ -0.16¤¤¤ -0.28¤¤¤ -0.20¤¤¤ 1
year97 0.10¤¤¤ 0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.02 1
23Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The buyer’s rent in equilibrium
U(v) = v(1 ¡ b(v))q(v) ¡ p(v) is a monotonic function of v: Indeed, let

























v00 ¡ v0 · (1 ¡ b(v
00))q(v
00) (13)
Since (1 ¡ b(v0))q(v0) ¸ 0; we obtain U(v00) ¸ U(v0):
The next step is to prove that the quantity of the output that the buyer
keeps (1 ¡ b(v))q(v) is also a non-decreasing function of v: Adding up (12),
we get (v00 ¡ v0)f(1 ¡ b(v00))q(v00) ¡ (1 ¡ b(v0))q(v0)g ¸ 0: Therefore v0 < v00
implies (1 ¡ b(v00))q(v00) ¸ (1 ¡ b(v0))q(v0): Therefore,
U(v) = U(0) +
Z v
0
(1 ¡ b(x))q(x)dx: (14)
Substituting p(v) = v(1¡b(v))q(v)¡U(v) into (5) we obtain that the seller















Apparently, U(0) = 0: Choosing optimal q and b is more complicated. If
barter were perfectly divisible, the solution would be straightforward. There
could be two cases. If pmb < pm then b = 0 and q = 1 whenever v > pm: If
pmb > pm then q = 1 whenever v > c=® and b = 1 for v < pmb: The former
case coincides with the monopoly equilibrium without barter. In the latter
case, buyers are split into three groups. The most e¢cient buyers pay cash
price pmb; the buyers with intermediate productivity v 2 (c=®;pmb) pay in
kind and the least productive buyers do not produce. Notice that in this
equilibrium both all buyers with v · pmb receive zero rent and are indi¤erent
24between producing and paying in kind or not producing at all. Above, we
assumed that whenever indi¤erent, buyers choose to produce. Therefore, to
make buyers with v < c=® shut down and buyers with v > c=® produce,
the seller must o¤er some in…nitesimal reward to the latter. This can be
done through making1 ¡ b(v) being strictly positive although very small.
Thus, although, in equilibrium b(v) is either 0 or very close to 1, perfect
divisibility of in-kind is crucial for separating buyers with v 2 (0;c=®) and
v 2 (c=®;pmb):
Formally, indivisibility of barter imposes the following constraint on the
choice of q and b :there can be either contracts without barter b = 0 with
various q or one contract with barter b = 1. The matter is that whenever
barter is present, buyers receive zero rent and are indi¤erent. Therefore they
choose to produce maximum amount. Let maximize (15) subject to this
constraint. Since buyers’ rent increases with v; there is certain ¹ v such that
all buyers with v > ¹ v will choose cash contracts b(v) = 0; q(v) 2 [0;1] and all
buyers with v < ¹ v will choose the barter contract b(v) = 1; q(v) = ~ q 2 [0;1].
The seller gets R 1
¹ v
n






0 f®v ¡ cgf(v)dv = (¹ v¡c)(1¡F(¹ v))+
~ qF(¹ v)(®G(¹ v) ¡ c):
There can potentially be three cases. First, it could be that ¹ v > p¤; then
f.o.c. requires ¹ v = pmb: Second, it could be ¹ v < p¤; then f.o.c. implies ¹ v = pm:
Third it could be ¹ v = p¤: However, in order ¹ v = p¤ to be a maximum, the
right-hand side derivative should be negative and the left-hand side derivative
should positive. Since ~ q = 0 for all ¹ v < p¤ and ~ q = 1 for ¹ v > p¤; this requires
1 ¡ F(p¤) ¡ p¤(1 ¡ ®)f(p¤) < 0 < 1 ¡ F(p¤) ¡ (p¤ ¡ c)f(p¤): Since ®p¤ ¸
®G(p¤) = c; this is not possible. Thus the optimal menu of contracts is either
f(pmb;0;1);(0;1;1);(0;0;0)g or f(pm;0;1);(0;0;0)g whichever provides the
seller with a higher payo¤. Let us denote ¹ c the value of c that solves
max
p2[0;1]
fp(1 ¡ F(p)) + ®G(p)F(p)g ¡ c = max
p2[0;1]
f(p ¡ c)(1 ¡ F(p))g
The seller chooses to use barter whenever the left-hand side is greater than
the right-hand side, i.e. c < ¹ c: Apparently, ¹ c increases with ® d¹ c=d® =
G(pmb)F(pmb)=F(pm); ¹ c ! 0 at ® ! 0:
Proof of Proposition 2. We will organize the proof in several steps.
Step 1. Prove that pb(N) and pnb(N) are decreasing functions of N and
pb(N) > pnb(N) for all N < Nb:
25Solving (9) for N we obtain
N = 1 + [(1 ¡ F(p))=f(p) ¡ (1 ¡ ®)p]=[p ¡ ®G(p)] (16)
which is a decreasing function of p. Consequently, the inverse function
pb(N) is also decreasing. Since pb(1) = pmb > p¤ and pb(1) = 0 there
exists a unique solution to pb(N) = p¤: Similarly, (10) implies N = (1 ¡
F(p))=[(p ¡ c)f(p)] which is a decreasing function. Since pnb(0) = 1 > p¤
and pb(1) = c < p¤ there exists a unique solution to pnb(N) = p¤:
For all N < Nb; we have pb(N) > p¤ and therefore ®G(pnb(N)) > c:








(®G(pb) ¡ c)N + ®(pb ¡ G(pb))
1 ¡ F(pb)
which implies pnb(N) > pb(N):
Step 2. Prove that Nb > Nnb:
This follows from Step 1. Indeed, both pnb(N) and pb(N) are continu-
ous decreasing functions, pnb(N) < pb(N) for all N < Nb and pnb(Nnb) =
pb(Nb) = p¤:
Step 3. Existence of equilibria.
The barter equilibrium exists if and only if pb(Nb) ¸ p¤ i.e. N · Nb: The
no-barter equilibrium exists if and only if pnb(Nnb) · p¤ i.e. N ¸ Nnb: The
rationed barter equilibrium exists if and only if both barter and no-barter
equilibria exist.
Step 4. Stability of equilibria.
Barter equilibrium at N < Nb and no-barter equilibrium at N > Nnb
are stable. Indeed if there is no barter and one seller deviates by o¤ering a
positive amount of barter sales, other sellers have no incentives to deviate. If,
in a barter equilibrium, one seller deviates by o¤ering less barter then other
sellers’s best response is to capture the unattended customer and therefore
restore total barter sales equal to F(p):
The rationed barter equilibrium is unstable. Indeed, if one seller chooses
to sell a little more for barter and a little less for cash, the price in the cash
market will increase which would make average quality of payments in kind
®G(p) greater than marginal cost of production c. Then all other sellers will
want to sell for barter and the barter equilibrium will be reached. Similarly,
if one seller decides to deviate from rationed barter equilibrium selling more
for cash and less for barter, ®G(p) will fall below c and everyone will give up
selling for barter so that no barter equilibrium will be reached.
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